From Proposal to Execution
As ECIP-1113 specifies it, a proposal would move through the stock OpenZeppelin Governor lifecycle, every step on-chain and public.
Propose
A proposal lists the calls it would make, with a description for voters that no contract reads. It is submitted through the Governor's standard propose function.
Vote
Core Contributors holding CoreNFT vote during the voting period, one vote each. The vote cannot be delegated, bought or transferred.
Queue
A proposal that passes is queued in the Timelock, the contract at the Treasury address, and waits out its delay in public.
Execute
After the delay, the Governor, the Timelock's only executor, carries it out. Value moves only from the Treasury's own balance.
Record
Each step emits the contracts' standard events, so every governance action can be reconstructed from event logs alone.
Membership: CoreNFT
Voting power would come from CoreNFT and nothing else: a soulbound token carrying one vote per member, which cannot be transferred, sold or delegated. There would be no fungible governance token, so no market in votes could form.
The first members would be those who verifiably contributed to the Olympia ECIPs or their reference client implementations by a published cutoff date. After that, contributors would apply and Olympia DAO would vote on each admission, with no admissions committee and no account that could admit anyone alone. A member could resign at any time, and Olympia DAO could revoke a seat by the same kind of vote.
Funding proposals
An Olympia Funding Proposal would be an ordinary Governor proposal that spends from the Treasury: a recipient, an amount, and a description written to a shared convention. ECIP-1114 adds no contract: no registry, no submission contract and no gate. The Olympia DAO dashboard would build the same proposal any author could build alone.
Each proposal would declare one of five categories, which describes what it would fund and restricts nothing.
- Core Development
- Client implementations and their maintenance, security patching and CVE response, release engineering and specification work.
- Critical Infrastructure
- Public RPC endpoints, block explorers, indexers and the services integrations depend on.
- Network Security
- Security review and audit, responsible disclosure, hashrate incentives, and bringing in contributors to replace departing maintainers.
- Ecosystem Growth
- Applications, tooling, integrations, documentation and the work that brings users and developers to the network.
- Other
- Anything the four above do not cover. A proposal is not disqualified by falling here.
Funding in tranches
A larger commitment could be paid as a milestone program: each tranche its own funding proposal, decided on the work delivered for it. Nothing would be held between tranches, so a program that stops delivering simply stops being funded.
Ecosystem Growth DAOs
Core Contributors could establish bodies scoped to growing what is built on Ethereum Classic, open to anyone without membership. Olympia DAO would decide, one season at a time and in the same vote as any other spending, whether to seed one, with how much, and within what theme. Once seeded, the body's own published model chooses among the destinations the seeding proposal named; a conditional market is one model it may use, and a published allocation strategy or a modular vote are others.
Client development, network security and critical infrastructure would never be such a body's mandate. They stay with Olympia DAO, decided by proposals voted directly in its Governor.
Sanctions screening
Before a Core Contributor votes on a funding proposal, the interface they vote through would screen its recipients against a sanctions list and show the result, offering no way to vote in favor of paying a designated address. Screening would be a lookup in the interface: no contract, no oracle and no role, and nothing stored on chain.
What Olympia DAO Would Not Do
- Decide protocol changes: those remain with the ECIP process, ECIP-1000.
- Hold an admin key, a privileged multisig or a committee.
- Let an off-chain entity approve or veto a governance action.
- Read a proposal's description in any contract: identifiers and metadata are for people, not code.
ECIP-1114 names Ethereum Classic DAO LLC as the legal wrapper Olympia DAO would use for the off-chain acts an on-chain organization cannot perform, such as signing an audit engagement Olympia DAO has voted to fund. Ethereum Classic DAO would be downstream of Olympia DAO in authority, and it holds no role in Olympia until Olympia DAO is operating. Ethereum Classic DAO and Olympia, in full →