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Olympia · ECIP-1112 · ECIP-1113

The Olympia Treasury

Proposed · Draft ECIPs · Activation block TBD

In the Olympia proposal, the Treasury would be the account at the Sovereignty Vault: the one permanent address at which Ethereum Classic's base-fee revenue would accumulate. The address would be permanent and the logic behind it repairable, and Olympia DAO would be the only route by which its balance could be spent.

How funds would reach it, and leave it

  1. Step 1

    Transactions

    Each would pay a base fee under ECIP-1111.

  2. Step 2

    Credit

    Inside that transaction’s own state transition, with no contract code run.

  3. Step 3

    Treasury

    The balance at the Sovereignty Vault address.

  4. Step 4

    Proposal

    A funding proposal, voted by Olympia DAO’s members.

  5. Step 5

    Timelock

    Queued, a public delay, then executed by the Governor.

What would fund it

The base fee is the protocol-directed source, and the only one. ECIP-1111 would credit each transaction's base fee to the Sovereignty Vault address where Ethereum destroys it: inside that transaction's own state transition, as a direct addition to the balance that runs no contract code and cannot fail.

Anyone could add to it by choice. The address would accept any asset, so there would be one contribution address for every asset class, and anything it holds could be moved by an ordinary proposal. The one exception is an ERC-777 token, whose transfer to it reverts, so the sender keeps it. A miner could also name the address as a block's coinbase, donating that block's reward. Donations Ethereum Classic DAO LLC receives off-chain are its own, not the Treasury's, and are accounted for separately.

Miner compensation would not change. Block rewards and priority-fee tips go to miners as before. Ethereum Classic has no base fee today, so nothing is taken from what miners earn now.

A permanent address, with repairable logic

Every client would carry the address in its chain configuration, so redirecting the network's revenue would take a coordinated hard fork. The account there would be a stock OpenZeppelin transparent proxy, so its logic could take a security fix or a dependency migration by an ordinary proposal while the address stands. Wyoming's DAO statute requires that every smart contract a DAO uses can be upgraded, and this design meets it.

WhatPermanent?Replaced by
The Sovereignty Vault addressYes: the consensus commitmentA hard fork, and nothing else
The Treasury’s logic, behind the addressNoA proposal, at the same address
The GovernorNoA proposal moving the Timelock’s roles to a successor
CoreNFT, the voting tokenNoA new Governor bound to a new token

One case cannot be repaired by a proposal: capture of the upgrade authority itself. The remedy would be a hard fork pointing the address at a newly deployed account, which bounds the loss to the balance held at the moment of capture and the revenue credited before the new block.

Who could spend it

Only Olympia DAO, by a proposal that passes a vote of its members, is queued in the Timelock and executes after its delay. Every step would be public and recorded in the contracts' events.

No key can move it

There would be no admin key, multisig or committee. The Governor alone would hold the Timelock’s roles to propose, execute and cancel, and the Treasury itself would own the contract that upgrades it.

No one off-chain can approve or veto

No off-chain entity could unilaterally approve or veto a governance action. Ethereum Classic DAO LLC, the legal wrapper ECIP-1114 contemplates, would hold no on-chain role.

Its balance is the only ledger

No implementation at the address may keep its own count of what it received, now or after any upgrade, so value credited by consensus can always be spent.

It cannot mint

It would hold and move what it receives and create nothing, so ECIP-1017 monetary policy is untouched.

Deployed before the fork

Every contract the revenue would pass through would be deployed on Ethereum Classic as it runs today, in dependency order, with no address predicted or reserved. The Treasury's address would be published, with the verified source of every contract at and beneath it, where upgrade authority rests and its full role table, before the activation block is scheduled.

The fork would then commit to an address anyone could inspect first. Before that block the balance is zero, and that window is where a change of Governor is rehearsed end to end, while nothing is at stake.

The order the ECIPs set for activation